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PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE. By Albert A. Ehrenzweig. Lei-
den: A.W. Sijthoff [distributed by Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.]. 1971. 
Pp. 395. $19.40. 
This is an exciting book, written in a colorful style that reveals 
an artistic temperament. When the author feels strongly (as he often 
does) about an issue of jurisprudence or legal policy, his manner of 
presentation attains a vigor sometimes approaching angry denuncia-
tion. The originality, freshness, and effervescence displayed in many 
parts of the book make its study a worthwhile experience. 
The range of subjects dealt with in the book amazes in its in-
clusiveness and diversity. The legend, "From Plato to Freud and 
after," which precedes the title page, announces Ehrenzweig's inten-
tion to come to grips with influential historical contributions to 
thinking about law; his analysis and evaluation, which often pro-
ceed in a flashlight-resembling mode of exposure, is found in the 
first part of the book. This part also contains a sketch of comparative 
jurisprudence, including a geographic survey of legal systems and 
a comparison of the general structure of the common law with that 
of the civil law. The connections of this chapter with the main 
theme of the book are not always clearly visible, but the treatment 
offers many illuminating insights as well as valuable corrections of 
traditional misconceptions. The second part of the book contains a 
compact record of Ehrenzweig's personal creed that goes far beyond 
an appraisal of the general foundations of law commonly found in 
jurisprudential works. It includes, for example, an excursion into 
problems of aesthetics, a statement by the author of his views on 
punishment, a critical evaluation of the bases of tort liability, and 
a plea for reforming the law of procedure. An eighty-page bibliogra-
phy listing works on jurisprudence and related disciplines is ap-
pended. 
Ehrenzweig's abundance of provocative suggestions, scattered 
over a great multitude of subjects, complicates the task of narrating 
the central ideas of the book. It is, however, possible to discern a red 
thread running through the somewhat baroque structure of the 
discourse. Ehrenzweig sees the future of jurisprudence in a philoso-
phy based on a new knowledge of the human mind. He uses the term 
"psychosophy" as an identifying mark for this new science. Its essen-
tial building stones have been furnished by the discoveries of Freud-
ian psychoanalysis, which, in his opinion, have rendered to shreds 
much (probably most) of pre-Freudian legal thought. Post-Freudian 
psychology, Ehrenzweig believes, has added some new insights, but 
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not many crucial ones. Any basic reform of the law, he declares, 
must pay deference to the Freudian truth. 
The break with the pre-Freudian past necessitates, in Ehren-
zweig's view, an abandonment of the search for absolute justice. He 
regards as a mirage any more-or-less unitary conception of justice that 
claims an objective philosophical validity. Although he is convinced 
that some sense of justice is inborn in all human beings, its mani-
festations appear in many diversified and often contradictory forms. 
Thus justice reduces itself, for the most part, to a conflict between 
individual "justnesses," which are praised or condemned in the 
light of our personal feelings. Ehrenzweig intimates, however, that 
this atomistic interpretation does not necessarily preclude the 
achievement of some consensus on the essential requirements of a 
group justice. 
One recurring subject of psychoanalytic dissection discussed by 
the author is the age-old battle between positivists and believers in 
natural law. This conflict, according to Ehrenzweig, is based on emo-
tional desires rather than rational disagreements, and its literature is 
dominated by rhetorical flourish rather than meaningful argument; 
this controversy should therefore be put to rest in post-Freudian 
jurisprudence. In his opinion, it is the antagonism between com-
peting conceptions of justice, and not the battle between naturalistic 
and positivistic views of the law, that poses the crucial problems of 
jurisprudence. 
The ubiquity of the theme of conflict in Ehrenzweig's "psy-
chosophy" is, of course, symptomatic of the acknowledged prove-
nience of his approach. Freudian psychoanalysis places great emphasis 
on internal conflicts in man's psyche, which result chiefly from the 
struggle of the id with the superego, as well as on the inevitability of 
external (political and social) combat attributable to the intrinsic 
aggressiveness of man. The dedication of Ehrenzweig's book to 
"Eros and Thanatos-to Life and Peace" and the reference in its 
last sentence to the struggle between "man's love of life" and his 
"yearning for peace" are intimations of the author's concurrence in 
Heraclitus' belief that strife is the father of all things, including 
things just and unjust. · 
At this point I should like to interpose a word of doubt and dis-
sent. There can be no question of Ehrenzweig's awareness that the 
dialectics of the human condition include the contrast of harmony 
and disharmony, of conflict and conflict resolution. Several refer-
ences are made, for example, to the use of the positive law as a medi-
ator and pacifier of contending conceptions of desirable law. Yet there 
is, at least in the mode of argumentation, a strong undercurrent of 
emphasis on irreconcilable differences in human conceptions of right 
and wrong, on man's innate pugnacity, and on the irrational nature 
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of justice. This attitude is epitomized in the positing of a contrast 
between man's love of life and his yearning for peace. I do not be-
lieve that the human desire for peace should be linked up with the 
Freudian death instinct. To be sure, the peace of the graveyard may 
prevail in a country in which a despotic government extinguishes all 
manifestations of an independent and potentially rebellious spirit. 
But there is also the creative, life-affirming peace of a society in 
which a substantial measure of cooperative solidarity has been 
achieved without the suppression of constructive conflict. I do not 
assert that Ehrenzweig would deny or discount this possibility. I am 
somewhat concerned, however, that a general acceptance of the be-
lief in man's preponderant irrationality and pugnacity might tend 
to put too much of a damper on, and thus discourage, human efforts 
to control aggression, a matter related today to the chances for 
human survival. 
I should also like to express my disagreement on some other facets 
of Ehrenzweig's exposition. I do not believe that the battle between 
adherents of natural law and positivistic jurisprudence is a "false 
conflict" evincing confused emotions rather than rational differences 
of opinion. For example, judicial review of legislation is proper for 
the positivist only if the positive law so provides. The natural-law 
advocate, on the other hand, may concede this power to the judge, 
in the absence of constitutional or statutory authorization, when the 
state has passed an unconscionable enactment. Secondly, although I 
agree fully with Ehrenzweig that no society should frame its ideal 
of justice in terms of one unitary goal value, I feel that the common 
core of agreement, in the civilized and developing countries of the 
world, on basic requirements of justice is greater than his discussion 
of the question would seem to suggest. Last but not least, I do not 
believe that the bulk of pre-Freudian legal philosophy has been ren-
dered obsolete by the Freudian dispensation. Rather, it seems that 
the ideas expressed by Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant, 
and Hegel are vitally relevant to the great issues of our time. I am 
also convinced that post-Freudian existential and humanistic psy-
chology, especially the logotherapy of Viktor Frankl, has made 
highly significant contributions to our understanding of man, de-
spite its strong criticism of some phases of Freudian orthodoxy. Al-
though I agree with Ehrenzweig that no one in his right mind can 
today ignore or intelligently belittle the epochal achievements of 
Freud, I have as yet to become persuaded that, in matters of psy-
chology relevant to the law, the last word of wisdom from Mount 
Sinai has been spoken by this great pathbreaker of human knowl-
edge. 
Edgar Bodenheimer, 
Professor of Law, 
University of California, Davis 
